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BOOK REVIEW
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS. By Andrew
von Hirsch. New York: Hill & Wang, 1976. Pp. xi, 179. $8.95.
Reviewed by Ira P. Robbins*
LEARNING BY REDOING
In the immediate aftermath of the Attica prison riots in 1971,1 the
Committee for the Study of Incarceration-funded by the Field and New
World Foundations and consisting of such notable academics as Alan
Dershowitz, Joseph Goldstein, Stanton Wheeler and Leslie Wilkins-
undertook to "consider afresh the fundamental concepts concerning what
is to be done with the offender after conviction." (P. xv.) Recognizing the
growing disenchantment with the American prison system, the Committee
sought, in more than twenty working sessions over a four-year period, to
integrate the thoughts of philosopher, historian, economist, political scien-
tist, sociologist, psychoanalyst and lawyer into a unitary whole, in order to
provide reformers with "a rationale to guide them in their quest for alterna-
tives." (P. xv.) What emerges from the study is
a conceptual model that differs considerably from the dominant
thinking about punishment during this century. The conventional
wisdom has been that the sentence should be fashioned so as to
rehabilitate the offender and isolate him from society if he is
dangerous. To accomplish that, the sentencer was to be given the
widest discretion to suit the disposition to the particular criminal.
... [W]e reject these notions as unworkable and unjust... [and]
conclude that the severity of the sentence should depend on the
seriousness of the defendant's crime or crimes-on what he did
rather than on what the sentencer expects he will do if treated in a
certain fashion. (Pp. xvi-xvii.) (Emphasis in original.)2
To effectuate its theory, the Committee recommends stringent limitations
on incarceration as punishment, with terms of incarceration (retermed
"collective residential restraint" (p. 107)) 3 rarely to exceed three years,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law; Director, Kansas
Defender Project; A.B., 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1973, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., NEW YORx STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE OFFI-
CIAL REPORT (1972).
2. Essentially this is a statement of act-orientation. See generally Fuller, Some Un-
explored Dimensions of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967, at 64 (A. Sutherland
ed. 1968). Act-oriented controversies "include the who, what, where, when, and how issues
before the court; [person-oriented controversies] involve the issues of motive, attitude, and
intent." Robbins, The Admissibility of Social Science Evidence in Person-Oriented Legal
Adjudication, 50 INDIANA L.J. 493, 499-500 (1975).
3. Compare the change in terms from "guard" to "correction officer" in NEW YORK
STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT passim (1972). "It
is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a
long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and to be imposed only for serious offenses; alternatives to incarceration
for non-serious offenses; sharply scaled-down penalties for first offenders;
reduction in sentencing disparity; narrowing in sentencing discretion; and
elimination of indeterminacy of sentence.
Bound by what it considers to be "the sense of injustices of the
current system, and the need for a workable solution," (p. xxvi) the
Committee acknowledges that the Report4 is not intended to "solve the
crime problem." (P. xviii.) Rather, because the criminal sanction is "a
quite limited tool" (p. xviii), 5 it proposes a means of making fairer the
existing process, which is "harsh, arbitrary, and lacking in coherent ratio-
nale." (P. xix.)
The Report essentially selects as a guiding principle the theory of
commensurate deserts, for it is argued that the experimental therapeutic
model of treating the criminal rather than the crime has not succeeded (pp.
xxxviii, 11-18).6 That model's concept of individualization is replete with
ultimately insoluble problems, including virtually unfettered discretion in
matters of sentencing and parole, 7 inherent indeterminacy of sentence in
the parole system, freedom of judges to decide similar cases differently,
and the bureaucratic vexation of administering the system. What is needed
is swift and certain punishment. Thus, the Benthamite utilitarian goal of
"the greatest happiness of the greatest number ' 8 is rejected for the Kant-
ian imperative, 9 which is founded in the concept of fair dealing and societal
equilibrium: when one individual infringes upon the rights of another, he
acquires an unfair advantage over all other individuals; punishment of the
violator counterpoises this disadvantage and restores the balance of ben-
efits and burdens. 10 As a theory of justice, the Committee's view orients
one's consideration to the defendant's acts, and depreciates the importance
4. Because an alternative subtitle of the book is REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
STUDY OF INCARCERATION, occasional reference is made in this Review to "the Report."
5. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
6. But see, e.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); N. MoaRs, THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 13-31 (1974); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Dralt
1962) (Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for Placing Defendant on
Probation).
7. The issue of the extent to which the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of procedural
due process applies to state parole release proceedings was recently before the United States
Supreme Court. See Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., unreported decision (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975), vacated and remanded for determination as to mootness, 97
S.Ct. 342 (1976).
8. See, e.g., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (J. Bowring ed. 1962). Individual treatment of offenders is an
application of utilitarian concepts in the sense that the optimum penalty is that which
maximizes the aggregate benefits, including crimes prevented, while minimizing the costs,
including the pain inflicted on punished offenders.
9. "The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the
serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from
the Justice of Punishment. I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195-96 (W. Hastie transi.
1887).
10. See, e.g., J. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 109-12, 140.44 (1970);
Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 478 (1968); Murphy, Marxism and Retribu-
tion, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 228 (1973).
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of his intention and habitude." As a foundation for the allocation of
penalties, it focuses on the seriousness of the offense committed and the
number and seriousness of prior convictions.
To be sure, as with most theories and their applications, this inquiry
includes a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies. For example, in
order for the just deserts principle properly to function, we need a society
that is structured in an equitable manner.' 2 Acknowledging that our society
and a criminal justice system with discretion and discrimination prior to
conviction 13 may create unfair disadvantages for some of those who neces-
sarily might be placed within the purlieus of the proposal, 14 the Committee
rejoins that the sentencing system "may simply not be capable of compen-
sating for the social ills of the wider society" (p. 147), that this study deals
with the issue less unfairly than do traditional utilitarian theories (pp.
147-49), that the question "comes down to one's view of our society" (p.
145), and that, in a society of unequal opportunity, "any scheme for
punishing must be morally flawed." (P. 149.) What is indeed unfortunate is
that the scheme suggested also may be logically and epistemologically
flawed.
The Report propounds that "[i]n the most obvious cases, the principle
[of commensurate deserts] seems a truism (who would wish to imprison
shoplifters for life, or let murderers off with small fines?)." (P. 66.) To this,
one might respond that if we could determine adequately that the shoplifter
is disposed toward a miscreant existence and that the murderer is not likely
to commit another crime, then we very well might wish to isolate the
former for life and only minimally punish-or punish not at all-the latter.
At issue is the prediction of harmful conduct,' 5 which can obfuscate even
the most obvious cases. The Report is unwilling to completely ignore such
predictions, and would tolerate predictive restraint in certain circumstances
(pp. 124-27). This allowance, however, is clearly incompatible with the
proposed theory of justice, and may even contain the seeds of its undoing.
11. See Robbins, supra note 2, at 499-504.
12. See generally Murphy, supra note 10.
13. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976);
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
14. Committee member Simon Rottenberg, in a separate statement, vehemently disagrees
with this conclusion: "I think [these] ideas ... are, for the most part, abysmally wrong. I am
at a loss to understand how they could have been generated by a committee such as this,
which was characterized by intelligence and erudition." (Pp. 176-77).
15, See, e.g., L. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE (1951); Dershowitz, The Law of
Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1970); Glueck, Ten
Years of Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 283 (1960); Kozol,
Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ.
371 (1972); Meehl & Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs,
Patterns and Cutting Scores, 52 PSYCH. BULL. 194 (1955); Schuessler, Parole Prediction: Its
History and Status, 45 J. CRIM. L. & C. 425 (1954); Wilkins, Prediction Methods: A Survey of
the Field from the Standpoint of Facts and Figures, in EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON CRIME
PROBLEMS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER METHODS OF TREATMENT 60(1967); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted
Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972).
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The proposal recommends that there be some pliancy in the applica-
tion of the theory to atypical cases and to first offenders.16 Yet if this be the
case, then the act-oriented antecedent of the thesis lapses, for if pun-
ishment is merited by virtue of the commission of a particular act in and of
itself, then the status of the offender or the special nature of the case
presumably should be irrelevant to the issues of whether and how much to
punish. The study further advises that the severity of the punishment
should depend not only upon the seriousness of the present conviction but
also upon the number and seriousness of prior ones. It is submitted,
however, that virtually any consideration of prior c~'enses impels a
person-oriented resolve, 17 thereby greatly weakening the foundation of the
Report.
Further difficulties inhere in the treatment of the notion of "serious-
ness," which is defined to include harm and culpability (p. 79). The Com-
mittee concedes that certain questions must, at this point in time, remain
unanswered-viz., "harm to what interests? 18 .. . [h]ow likely must the
risk be? ... should it matter whether or not the injury actually occurs?...
[how do we deal with an] offender's motives? 19 . . . [and] whose standards
should govern?" (pp. 81-82)-and, further, that its discussion is meant only
"to suggest that something can be said about seriousness-and that this
inquiry is worth pursuing." (P. 77.) (Emphasis in original.) What is impor-
tant, however, is that this toleration for further inquiry was not extended
sufficiently to alternative theories as well. It is true that the Report is not so
partial that it cannot perceive the justifications for competing ideas and
their possible effectuation. 20 But the paramount point is that after criticiz-
16. "We . . .suggest that each crime category be assigned a 'presumptive sentence'-
that is, a specific penalty based on the crime's characteristic seriousness. This would be the
disposition for most offenders convicted of that crime. However, the judge should be
authorized-within specified limits-to depart from the presumptive sentence if he finds
aggravating or mitigating circumstances." (P. 99.) Compare the parole guidelines used by the
United States Parole Commission, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). See also UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, You AND THE PAROLE BOARD 4-5 (1975):
[Question] 13. Are The Examiners Required To Follow The Guidelines?
No, they serve only as a general indicator for use during their
deliberation. They may agree on any decision regardless of the
Guidelines, but when they parole or continue a case for a period not
called for in the Guidelines they must state in writing what the
special reasons are which justify their decision.
In making their decision the Examiners may take into account
anything of importance which may affect your chance of succeeding
on parole. Since no two persons' situations are alike, factors of
importance in one case may not be important in another.
17. At least one member of the Committee shares this critique: "This thinly disguised
throwback to individualization and concern for an offender's 'culpability'-4.e., failure tolearn from (be reformed by) punishment for his prior offense-undercuts much of the report's
most significant point, which is that in determining the seriousness of an offense, and hence
the severity of the punishment, focus must be on the crime committed, not on the individual
who commits it." (P. 172.) (separate statement of Professor Joseph Goldstein).
18. The Committee further notes that "[h]arm is a debatable matter. ... (P. 92.).
19. See also Robbins, supra note 2, at 499-516.
20. For example, the Report notes: "It would be an exaggeration to say that no treatment




ing the concept of an abuse-prone discriminatory criminal justice system
and developing a rationale for its potential correction, the Committee
settles upon a flexible and discretionary system with as few clear guidelines
as the present one.
The preceding exegesis is not intended to dispraise the good faith or
competence of the members of the Committee. Without question, they
realize that there is nothing original in criticizing the American system of
criminal justice. They further recognize that their investigation was not a
novel one, for "as long as we have relied upon prisons and mental hospitals
to treat and correct the deviant, so long have committees met to analyze
the inadequacies of the institutions and to recommend improvements." (P.
xxi.) 21 Finally, they acknowledge that other principles than commensurate
deserts must play some part in any system of justice. Thus the Report's
imperfections perhaps derive in part from the fact that although the final
position is one of compromise, it is advanced without the tensions and
recriminations that the term implies. But one wonders whether any indi-
vidual position ultimately could have been any less flawed.
The problem of crime has been approached from many perspectives,
including that of the offender, 22 the victim, 23 the norms being violated, 24
the supporting subcultural norms, 25 the availability of resources and oppor-
tunity,26 and the system of social control. 27 But the simplification of the
21. Significantly omitted from the Report is a discussion of the conditions of confinement.
22. See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (S. Solvay & J. Mueller
transl., G. Catlin ed. 1950); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
(1950); E. SUTHERLAND, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF (1937); Blum & Braunstein, Mind-
Altering Drugs and Dangerous Behavior: Narcotics, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS
AND DRUG ABUSE 40 (1967); Cason & Pescor, A Statistical Study of 500 Psychopathic
Prisoners, 61 PUB. HEALTH 557 (1946); Gibbons & Garrity, Definitions and Analysis of
Certain Criminal Types, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 28 (1962); Montagu, The Biologist Looks at
Crime, 217 ANNALS 46 (1951); Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offender, FED. PROB.,
June, 1955, at 7.
23. See, e.g., L. SCHULTZ, RAPE VICTIMOLOGY (1975); S. SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND
HIS CRIMINAL: A STUDY IN. FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1968); Wolfgang, Victim-
Precipitated Criminal Society, 48 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1957).
24. See, e.g., I. CHEIN, D. GERARD, R. LEE & E. ROSENBERG, THE ROAD To H (1964);
E. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, & SOCIAL CONTROL (1967); E. SCHUR,
CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (1965); C. SHAW, THE JACK ROLLER (1930); L. WILKINS, SOCIAL
DEVIANCE (1964); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 158 (1967);
Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1963).
25. See, e.g., F. ALEXANDER & W. HEALY, ROOTS OF CRIME (1935); R. MERTON,
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1953); C. SHAW & H. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (1969); A. COHEN, The Content of the Delinquent Subculture, in
DELINQUENT BOYS 24 (1955); R. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. Soc. REV.
672 (1938); Miller, Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J.
Soc. IssuES 5 (1958); O'Donnell, The Rise and Decline of a Subculture, 15 Soc. PROB. 73(1967); Sellin, Culture Conflict and Crime, in Soc. Sci. RES. COUN. BULL. 41 (1938); Yab-
lonsky, The Delinquent Gang as a Near Group, 7 Soc. PROB. 108 (1959).
26. See, e.g., R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960);
Glaser & Rice, Crime, Age, and Employment, 24 AM. Soc. REV. 680 (1959).
27. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); W.
GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974); JUSTICE IN SENTENC-
ING (L. Orland & H. Tyler eds. 1974); J. ROBERTSON, ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON
LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS (1974); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); J. WILSON,
VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968); Foote, The Bail System and Equal Justice, FED.
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problem to any singular aspect of the situational paradigm has been less
than fruitful, in terms of either the strategies for controlling crime or the
ideological justifications advanced to support them. Intensifying the lack of
success are the system's multiple objectives of restraint, general deter-
rence, individual deterrence, rehabilitation, and desert, which, though
necessarily intertwined, have been impossible to reconcile-the Report of
the Committee for the Study of Incarceration being no exception. Thus we
are faced with the proverbial vicious circle: in order to approach the
problem of crime in our society, we must establish a theoretical justifica-
tion to support a proposed system of criminal justice; but in order ade-
quately to fulfill the theory, we must consider and balance concepts which
are inconsistent therewith.
At its base, the question then becomes whether, in our sullen state of
less-than-perfect knowledge, 28 we should abandon any attempt to amelior-
ate the contemporary arrangement, or persist with our existing expedient
measures which will have to be altered with experience. 29 A reciprocal
query is whether the public will acquiesce in any proposal inviting stagna-
tion, while the emotions and realities of the criminal justice system are
confronted on a daily basis. The Committee's reply is that its theory
presents a workable starting point, and one which merits consideration if
we are to avoid a sense of hopelessness: "What we offer are partial
solutions, while awaiting more insights, greater knowledge, and more com-
plete answers in some hoped-for future." (P. xxxix.)
When commencing its deliberations, the Committee well realized that
it might "reinvent the wheel." (P. xxxiv.) 30 But that step was a vital one to
undergo, for only if our ideas are more intelligently conceived and executed
can we progress from what seems now to be labyrinthine perplexity to
clear a more direct route toward truth and understanding, as well as toward
the doing of justice. In our gradual transformation from the Kantian "trow-
PRoB., September, 1955, at 43; Mott, Judicial Personnel, 167 ANNALS 143 (1933); Nagel,
Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 3 (1962); Newman,
Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRmM. L.C. & P.S. 780
(1956).
28. "Our solution is one of despair, not hope." (P. xxxix.).
29. Compare the evolution of a standard for determining whether in the prison context a
particular set of circumstances constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth
amendment. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man .... The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."). See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1049 and 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (conditions of solitary confinement as constituting cruel
and unusual punishment); Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971) (failure
to protect prisoners from assault); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (nature of
physical abuse); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (conditions of the
institution); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971); Robbins, Book Review, 62 VA. L. REv. 462, 467-68 (1976).
30. Professor Leslie Wilkins expressed this thought differently: "It seems that we have
rediscovered 'sin,' in the absence of a better alternative!" (P. 178.).
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ing" to "knowing" 31 we should not despair, because "[f]or [some of] the
things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them."3 2
31. The holding anything to be true, or the subjective validity of a judgment admits,
with reference to the conviction which is at the same time valid objectively, of the
three following degrees, trowing, believing, and knowing. Trowing is to hold true,
with the consciousness that it is insufficient both subjectively and objectively. If the
holding true is sufficient subjectively, but is held to be insufficient objectively, it is
called believing; while, if it is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is called
knowing.
I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 524 (F. Muller transl. 1966) (original emphasis).
32. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics, bk. II, ch. I.
